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There are two main factors limiting the performance of quantum key distribution — channel
transmission loss and noise. Previously, a linear bound was believed to put an upper limit on the
rate-transmittance performance. Remarkably, the recently proposed twin-field and phase-matching
quantum key distribution schemes have been proven to overcome the linear bound. In practice,
due to the intractable phase fluctuation of optical signals in transmission, these schemes suffer from
large error rates, which renders the experimental realization extremely challenging. Here, we close
this gap by proving the security based on a different principle — encoding symmetry. With the
symmetry-based security proof, we can decouple the privacy from the channel disturbance, and
eventually remove the limitation of secure key distribution on bit error rates. That is, the phase-
matching scheme can yield positive key rates even with high bit error rates up to 50%. In simulation,
with typical experimental parameters, the key rate is able to break the linear bound with an error
rate of 13%. Meanwhile, we provide a finite-data size analysis for the scheme, which can break the
bound with a reasonable data size of 1012. Encouraged by high loss- and error-tolerance, we expect
the approach based on symmetry-protected privacy will provide a new insight to the security of
quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-
theoretically secure means to distribute private keys be-
tween distant parties by harnessing the laws of quantum
mechanics [1, 2]. The commercialization and application
of QKD raise requirements in both impregnable security
and outstanding performance.
The security, as the cornerstone of QKD, has been
proven theoretically at the end of last century [3–5] on
the protocol level, while rigorous definition [6, 7] and
strict finite-size analysis [8, 9] have been provided later.
The security of QKD is based on the idea that informa-
tion gain means disturbance. That is, any eavesdrop-
per’s attempt of learning the keys would inevitably in-
troduce disturbance to the quantum states. To char-
acterize the information leakage, the disturbance in the
channel is monitored in real time. In practice, the phys-
ical devices used in practical implementations often de-
viate from the assumed theoretical models [10], resulting
in various loopholes and corresponding attacks [11, 12].
In 2012, measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution (MDI-QKD) has been presented [13], which
removes the theoretical assumptions on measurement de-
vices in security analysis and hence closes all the detec-
tion loopholes.
The performance of QKD, on the other hand, charac-
terized by the key generation rate with respect to the
communication distance, reflects its value in commer-
cial cryptographic task. Under the circumstances that
quantum repeaters [14–16], as the ultimate solution to
extend quantum communication against losses, are cur-
rently infeasible, the linear key rate-transmittance bound
∗ xma@tsinghua.edu.cn
[17] was widely believed to hold for all the point-to-point
QKD schemes without repeaters. For the commonly used
telecom fiber channel, the transmittance decreases ex-
ponentially with the transmission distance, which puts
an upper limit on quantum transmission distance. In-
terestingly, the recent work of twin-field QKD open the
new possibility of phase-encoding MDI-QKD protocol
to break the linear key rate bound [18]. A follow-up
work, named phase-matching quantum key distribution
(PM-QKD) has been proposed [19, 20], which has been
rigorously shown to be able to beat the linear bound
even with statistical fluctuations [21]. The twin-field-like
MDI-QKD is currently a heated topic [22–25].
In PM-QKD, only one basis is adopted for key genera-
tion and parameter estimation, which is distinct from the
former BB84-type protocol while shares some similarities
with the Bennett-1992 protocol [26]. Essentially, the PM-
QKD protocol can be viewed as an MDI version of the
Bennett-1992 protocol [27]. To understand the security
of PM-QKD, we would resort to the non-orthogonality of
the encoded state with 0/pi encoding. However, the anal-
ysis based on non-orthogonality usually cannot tolerate
high channel losses.
In this work, for a general PM-QKD model, we estab-
lish a connection between the encoding symmetry and
privacy, which serves as a new viewpoint of QKD se-
curity other than the conventional basis complementar-
ity [28]. In this symmetry-based security proof, we first
define symmetric states given certain encoding opera-
tions, then explore the realistic construction of symmetric
states, and finally propose efficient methods to estimate
the ratio of detection caused by symmetric states. For
PM-QKD, the symmetric state can promise perfect pri-
vacy, i.e., with no information leakage. As a result, the
amount of information leakage only depends on the state
producing by the source, and is irrelevant of the channel
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2condition. A similar phenomenon is also observed in the
round-robin differential-phase-shifting protocol [29]. The
symmetry-based security proof allows higher error toler-
ance compared with the original BB84 protocol. Further-
more, we complete finite-size analysis with an improved
decoy-state method [30–32].
II. ENCODING SYMMETRY AND PERFECT
PRIVACY
To show the close relationship between encoding sym-
metry and privacy, we introduce an idealized scenario,
named symmetric-encoding QKD. As is shown in Fig. 1,
during each run, Alice and Bob start with a pre-shared
bipartite state ρAB , where the systems held by Alice and
Bob are denoted as A and B, respectively. They gen-
erate random bits κa and κb independently and apply
U(κa(b)) ≡ Uκa(b) to their subsystem A and B separately,
where U2 = I. Then, the modulated state, denoted
as ρ′AB(κa, κb), is sent to an untrusted party Eve, who
measures the joint state, aiming to discriminate whether
κa = κb or κa 6= κb, and announces the detection result.
In each round, Alice and Bob encode 2-bit information,
κa, κb, into the state ρAB . The encoded state ρ
′
AB(κa, κb)
can be written as
ρ′AB(κa, κb) = [UA(κa)⊗UB(κb)]ρAB [UA(κa)⊗UB(κb)]†.
(1)
After many rounds, Alice and Bob generate random bit
strings Ka and Kb, respectively. With the assistance of
Eve’s announcement and classical error correction, Bob
reconciles his bit string Kb to Ka. They then perform
privacy amplification on Ka to extract a private key.
U(κ)
A
B
Eve
ρ!"{
U(κ#)
ρ!"(κ, κ#)‘
FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of the symmetric-encoding proto-
col.
Now, let us focus on a symmetric case, where the pre-
shared state ρAB keeps invariant under the transforma-
tion of encoding operation UA⊗UB . That is, a pure state
|ψ〉AB is invariant under the encoding operation if
|ψ〉AB = UA ⊗ UB |ψ〉AB . (2)
Then, |ψ〉AB is an eigenstate of UA ⊗ UB . Since (UA ⊗
UB)
2 = I, the eigenvalue of UA ⊗UB is either +1 or −1.
We name the eigenvalue +1 subspace of UA ⊗ UB as the
even space Heven and the eigenvalue −1 subspace as the
odd space Hodd. The states lie in Heven are called even
states and the states lie inHodd are called odd states. To-
gether they are called parity states. Obviously, a mixture
of odd (even) states is still an odd (even) state.
For a generic mixture of pure parity states, ρAB =∑
i pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|, where all the components {|ψi〉} are par-
ity states, it keeps invariant under UA ⊗ UB ,
ρ′AB(0, 0) = ρ
′
AB(1, 1),
ρ′AB(0, 1) = ρ
′
AB(1, 0).
(3)
The raw key bit information κa is “hidden” on the en-
coded state ρ′AB(κa, κb). However, when Eve holds the
purification of ρAB , she may still learn κa from the en-
coded state. Without loss of generality, we consider a
purification of ρAB , |Ψ〉ABC =
∑
i
√
pi |ψi〉AB |i〉C , where
system C is held by Eve. Under the encoding operation
UA⊗UB , all the odd and even state components of {|ψi〉}
will gain a factor −1 and 1, respectively. If there are
only odd or even components in ρAB , the purified state
|Ψ〉ABC will keep unchanged under the encoding oper-
ation. On the other hand, the coexistance of odd and
even components in ρAB will lead to a change of relative
phase in |Ψ〉ABC , allowing Eve to discriminate ρ′AB(0, 0)
and ρ′AB(1, 1).
To make the observations above rigorous, in Appendix
A, we analyze the security of symmetric-encoding QKD
with a standard phase-error-correction approach [4, 5,
28]. When the input state ρAB is an (even or odd) parity
state, the symmetric-encoding QKD protocol shown in
Fig. 1, is perfectly private, which is reflected by a zero
phase error rate E(ph) = 0. Moreover, if ρAB is a mixture
of even and odd state,
ρAB = poddρodd + pevenρeven, (4)
then we can estimate the ratios of odd and even compo-
nents causing effective detection,
qodd = podd
Yodd
Q
,
qeven = peven
Yeven
Q
,
(5)
where Yodd, Yeven, and Q are the successful detection
probability of ρodd, ρeven, and ρAB , respectively. The
phase error rate is E(ph) = qeven. Therefore, the key rate
is given by
r = 1−H(E)−H(qeven) (6)
where E is the quantum bit error rate. Here, we can see
that as long as the final state post-selected by successful
detection is close to a parity state (either even or odd),
the information leakage can be bounded.
3III. PHASE-MATCHING QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
The problem for implementing the symmetric-
encoding protocol is that both the parity states ρodd
and ρeven are usually nonlocal. That is, they cannot be
obtained by Alice and Bob via independent local state
preparation. Thus, they will inevitably prepare a mixture
of even and odd parity states in practice. The PM-QKD
protocol can be regarded as a realization of symmetric-
encoding QKD, where Alice and Bob construct the par-
ity state input ρAB using two optical modes based on
independent laser sources. To construct parity state ρAB
from experimentally accessible coherent states, a natural
way is to perform simultaneous 0/pi phase-randomization
on two coherent states
∣∣√µa〉A , ∣∣√µb〉B to decouple the
odd and even photon components.
For the convenience of parameter estimation, we
consider the PM-QKD protocol where Alice and Bob
randomize the phase φ on
∣∣√µaeiφ〉A , ∣∣√µbeiφ〉B con-
tinuously so that the photon number components
{|m,n〉}m+n=k are decoupled,
ρAB =
∞∑
k=0
pkρk, (7)
where ρk a pure parity state since it is a Fock state. The
overall phase error of PM-QKD is given by
qeven = 1−
∑
k
q2k+1 (8)
where qk is the fraction of detection when Alice and Bob
send out k-photon signals,
qk = Pµt(k)
Yk
Qµt
. (9)
Here µt = µa + µb; Yk is the yield of k-photon compo-
nent; Qµt is the overall gain, i.e., the successful detec-
tion probability when Alice and Bob send out coherent
lights with intensities of µa and µb, respectively; and
Pµt(k) = e
−2µ(2µ)k/(k!) is the Poisson distribution. In
order to estimate the information leakage, we only need
to estimate the fraction of odd state detections.
The simultaneous phase-randomization is also nonlo-
cal. To achieve this in practice, Alice and Bob first ran-
domize the phase independently, and then post-select the
pulses with the same random phase by phase announce-
ment and sifting [33]. The overall privacy, characterized
by the overall phase error rate, will not change after the
random phase announcement [19, 21], which indicates
that simultaneous phase randomization can be replaced
by independent phase randomization and post-selection.
In each turn, Alice and Bob each generates a ran-
dom phase φa(b) and a random key bit κa(b). They
then modulate their coherent pulse
∣∣∣√µa(b)〉 by a phase
(φa(b) + piκa(b)). After Eve announces the detection re-
sult, they announce the random phases φa(b) to group
the signals with the same random phase difference. From
the detection result, they estimate the information leak-
age and extract key from the encoding bits. In practice,
the continuous phase randomization can be replaced with
discrete randomization [34]. The detailed analysis of PM-
QKD with phase post-selection and discrete phase ran-
domization is presented in Appendix B.
In discrete-phase encoding, Alice and Bob randomly
pick up one of the D phases equally distributed in [0, 2pi).
They announce the discrete random phase φa =
2pi
D ja
and φb =
2pi
D jb with the indexes ja(b) = 0, 1, ..., D − 1.
Based on the random phase difference, they group the
signals by js = (jb − ja) mod D2 . For example, when
D = 16, the signals with jb − ja = 1 and 9 are in the
same group. After grouping, there is D2 groups with the
label of js = 0, 1, ...,
D
2 − 1. In the ideal case, the signals
with js = 0 are the signals with matched phase. For
the signals with js 6= 0, there is an intrinsic mismatched
phase φδ. It is conservative to regard φδ being caused
by Eve in security analysis. For each group of data, the
information leakage can be bounded by qeven in Eq. (8),
regardless of Eve’s measurement setting or the bit error
rates.
Thanks to this decoupled relationship between pri-
vacy and channel disturbance, we can improve the post-
processing step by utilizing the unaligned data with
js 6= 0. Alice and Bob first reconcile their sifted raw
key bits Ka and Kb with for each group js separately. If
the error rate in a group of data is too large, they can
simply discard that group. Denote the group set J to be
the set of remaining phase group indexes {js}. That is,
if js ∈ J , then the phase group js is kept for key genera-
tion. They then estimate the even photon fraction qeven
for all the remaining data and perform privacy amplifica-
tion. Note that qeven is the same for different data group
js. The overall key rate of PM-QKD, taking the phase
sifting and loss into account, is given by
R =
2Qµ
D
∑
js∈J
[1−H(qeven)− fH(Ejs)] , (10)
where f is the error correction efficiency, and Ejs is the
bit error rate of phase group js with µia = µib = µ/2.
In the experiment, all the parameters in Eq. (10) can
be directly obtained except for qeven, which needs to be
bounded by the decoy-state method. It has been shown
in literature that with the infinite decoy-state method
[31], all the parameters, including qeven can be estimated
accurately [19, 20].
IV. ROBUSTNESS TO LOSS AND NOISE
To test the capability to tolerate high noises, we simu-
late the performance of PM-QKD in the asymptotic limit,
under different level of misalignment errors, with D = 16
discrete phases. In simulation model, there are three
major error source: the system misalignment error ed,
4caused by phase fluctuation and system misalignment;
the background error, caused by dark counts pd; and the
mismatch error e∆(js) caused by the intrinsic mismatch
for different phase groups,
e∆(js) =
{
sin2(pijsD ), 0 ≤ js ≤ D4 ,
sin2(pi2 − pijsD ), D4 < js ≤ D2 − 1,
(11)
which is related to the index deviation 0 ≤ js ≤ D/2−1.
The overall bit error rate E
(js)
µ is then given by
E(js)µ = min
{
[pd + ηµ(e∆(js) + ed)]
e−ηµ
Qµ
, 0.5
}
, (12)
where η is the transmittance.
In practice, the phase drift caused by lasers and fiber
links will degrade the performance of PM-QKD. To avoid
the effect caused by phase drift, one demanding way is to
introduce active feedback and phase locking. Another en-
hancement is to introduce the phase post-compensation
method [19], where Alice and Bob can estimate the phase
drift φδ by strong light pulses, record it and take it into
account in the sifting step. Suppose the phase drift is
slow, then Alice and Bob is able to figure out the closest
discrete phase φj ≡ 2piD j to φδ. Denote the index of the
closest discrete phase as jδ. During the sifting step, Alice
and Bob modify the definition of js to js = ja−jb−jδ. In
this sense, Alice and Bob “post-compensate” the effect
caused by phase drift.
With the parameters given in Table I, we simulate the
asymptotic key rate performance under the setting of sys-
tem misalignment error rates ed of 1%, 5%, 9% and 13%.
Note that, the normal symmetric BB84 protocol cannot
yield any positive key rate under the misalignement error
ed ≥ 11%. Surprisingly, from Fig. 2, one can see, even
if ed = 13%, the key rate of PM-QKD is still able to
surpasses the linear bound when l > 330 km. This illus-
trates the robustness of PM-QKD against both noisy and
lossy channel. In an extreme case when the source light
intensity µ → 0 and the dark count of detector pd = 0,
the single photon fraction among all the detected signal
q1 → 1 according to Eq. (9), hence the phase error rate
E(ph) → 0. In this case, the key rate of PM-QKD R > 0
even when the bit error E
(js)
µ is close to 50%.
V. FINITE SIZE PERFORMANCE
With the symmetry-based security proof of PM-QKD,
the finite-size analysis can be much simplified. In a com-
plete finite-size analysis, we should take the cost and
failure probability of channel authentication, error verifi-
cation, privacy amplification, and parameter estimation
into account. However, the cost of the first three steps
are negligible comparing to the one in parameter estima-
tion. When the final key length is much larger than 37
bits, we can ignore the corresponding failure probability
with a constant secret key cost [9]. For simplicity, we
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FIG. 2. Rate-distance performance of PM-QKD under differ-
ent system misalignment error rates ed. For BB84, ed = 1.5%.
The non-smooth point indicates the places where the key con-
tribution from unaligned groups with js 6= 0 turns to 0.
ignore these parts in our analysis. The phase error esti-
mation is the at the core of finite-size analysis. According
to Eqs. (8) and (9), our task is to estimate the number of
clicks caused by odd-photon fraction in the phase groups
J , with signal intensity µa = µb = µ/2. The Chernoff
bound is applied to bound the statistical fluctuation of
decoy parameters [35]. We leave the details of the finite
decoy-state analysis in Appendix C.
To demonstrate the practicality of PM-QKD, we per-
form simulation with finite data sizes, as shown in Fig. 3.
The key rate beat the linear bound at 270 km under the
condition where data size N = 1× 1012 and system mis-
alignment error ed = 3%. When the system misalign-
ment error is 6%, which can be easily realizd in current
experimental implementation, linear bound is exceeded
at a similar length of 270 km, where, as an expense, the
data size should be enlarged into N = 1 × 1013. Note
that in the decoy analysis, the rounds with mismatched
phases are also used for parameter estimation, which is
substantiated by the fact that the single-photon state is
ρ1 = 12 (|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|), regardless of the send-
ing intensity and random phase difference. With this
observation, the size of available data for parameter esti-
mation is enlarged, which marginally reduces the impact
of statistical fluctuation and results in a higher key rate.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We analyze the security of a generalized version of PM-
QKD protocol, from which we provide a new perspective
where the privacy of QKD originates from the encoding
symmetry. In PM-QKD, the parity symmetry protects
the privacy of parity states. In the same manner, here
we conjecture that the translation symmetry of encoded
state in the round-robin differential-phase-shifting pro-
5TABLE I. List of parameters for the simulations shown in
Fig. 2 and 3. The failure probability  and sending rounds N
is used for the finite data size analysis in Fig. 3.
Parameters Values
Dark count rate pd 1× 10−8
Error correction efficiency f 1.1
Detector efficiency ηd 20%
Number of phase slices D 16
BB84 misalignment error e
(BB84)
d 1.5%
Failure probability  1.7× 10−10
Sending rounds N 1× 1012 or 1× 1013
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FIG. 3. Rate-distance performance of PM-QKD under the
data size N = 1 × 1012, 1 × 1013 or infinitely large, and mis-
aligned error ed = 3% or 6%.
tocol may explain why the information-leakage will not
be affected by the channel noise, and leave it for future
works.
The symmetry-protected quality not only makes PM-
QKD robust against channel disturbance, but also sim-
plifies the parameter estimation and finite-size analysis
considerably. With improved decoy-state analysis, we
have demonstrated the capability of PM-QKD to sur-
pass linear bound with data size N = 1× 1013, currently
accessible experimental devices, and high noise level of
6%. Note that, the discrete phase randomization with
{φ = 2pi jD}D−1j=0 and imbalanced Alice and Bob’s signal
intensity µa, µb will not destroy the parity-symmetry es-
sentially. This implies a natural extension of PM-QKD
analysis to the cases with few discrete random phases and
imbalanced intensity arrangement of Alice and Bob.
Due to the universality of encoding symmetry and ex-
istence of symmetric states, we expect this symmetry-
based analysis will benefit the security proof of a large
variety of QKD protocols. For example, the analysis
of encoding operation with parity symmetry U2 = I
in this work can be extended to the n-fold rotational
symmetry case, i.e., Un = I, where n ≥ 2. Moreover,
this symmetry-based analysis can be extended to the
case where the security proof is not obvious in an usual
complementarity-based security view, for example, the
continuous-variable QKD protocol.
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We provide detailed security analysis and simulation
methods. In Section A, we present the security proof for
the symmetric-encoding QKD. In Section B, we apply the
symmetry-based security proof to the PM-QKD protocol,
with practical issues taken into account. In Section C,
we give the detailed finite data size analysis. Finally, we
list the steps of numerical simulation in Section D.
Appendix A: Proof of symmetry-protected privacy
In this section, we provide security analysis of
symmetric-encoding QKD. We first review the security
proof based on phase error correction [4, 5]. Then,
we present a general entanglement-based symmetric-
encoding protocol by establishing the link between sym-
metric states and perfect privacy.
Denote D(HA) as the space of density operators act-
ing on HA and L(HA) as the space of linear opera-
tors acting on HA. For a qubit system A′, the Hilbert
space is denoted by HA′ . The Pauli operators on HA′
are XA′ , YA′ and ZA′ . The eigenstates of XA′ , YA′ and
ZA′ are {|±〉A′}, {|±i〉A′}, and {|0〉A′ , |1〉A′}, respec-
tively. The X-basis measurement is denoted by MX :
{|+〉A′ 〈+| , |−〉A′ 〈−|}. The Z-basis measurement is de-
noted by MZ : {|0〉A′ 〈0| , |1〉A′ 〈1|}. The four Bell state
are
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
(A1)
For a qubit A′ and a qudit A, the controlled-U operation
is defined as
CA′A = |0〉A′ 〈0| ⊗ IA + |1〉A′ 〈1| ⊗ UA. (A2)
1. Security definition
In QKD, the two communication parties, Alice and
Bob, will finally obtain a pair of bit strings Sa and Sb
6with a length of Nk (if the protocol succeeds), which can
be correlated to a quantum state held by Eve. The joint
state ρABE is a classical-classical-quantum state,
ρABE =
∑
sa,sb
PrSa,Sb(sa, sb) |sa〉A 〈sa|⊗|sb〉B 〈sb|⊗ρ(sa,sb)E ,
(A3)
where Sa, Sb are random variables and sa, sb ∈ {0, 1}Nk
are the values. In particular, an ideal key state held by
Alice and Bob is described by the private state,
ρidealABE = (2
Nk)−1
∑
s
|s〉A 〈s| ⊗ |s〉B 〈s| ⊗ ρE , (A4)
where sa = sb = s implies that Alice and Bob hold the
same string, and ρE is independent of s, that is, Eve have
no information on the key string variable S.
A QKD protocol is defined to be -secure, if the final
distilled state ρABE is -closed to any private state ρ
ideal
ABE
with a proper chosen ρE
min
ρE
1
2
||ρABE − ρidealABE ||1 ≤ , (A5)
where ||A||1 ≡ Tr[
√
A†A] is the trace norm.
Usually, we would like to decompose the secret defini-
tion to two parts, secrecy and correctness. A QKD proto-
col is defined to be cor-correct, if the probability distri-
bution PrSa,Sb(sa, sb) of the final state ρABE in Eq. (A3)
satisfies
PrSa,Sb(sa 6= sb) ≤ cor. (A6)
A QKD protocol is defined to be sec-secret, if the state
ρAE is closed to the single-party private state ρ
ideal
AE
min
ρE
1
2
||ρAE − ρidealAE ||1 ≤ sec, (A7)
where ρidealAE ≡ (2Nk)−1
∑
s |s〉A 〈s|⊗ρE . If a QKD proto-
col is cor-correct and sec-secret, then it is (cor + sec)-
secure [28].
2. Security proof based on phase error correction
Here, we briefly review the main idea of phase-error-
based security proof, which is first proposed by Lo-
Chau [4], reduced to prepare-and-measure scheme later
by Shor-Preskill [5], and improved by Koashi later [28].
In an entanglement-based QKD protocol, Alice and
Bob will finally share a large bipartite state ρAB . De-
note Alice’s and Bob’s subspace in a single run as HA
and HB . Here, the encrypted error correction is used to
decouple the error correction and privacy amplification.
The protocol is presented as below.
Actual protocol
1. (State distribution) Alice and Bob share a bipartite
state ρAB in the space (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n, where n is
the total number of runs.
2. (Measurement) Alice and Bob measure their sys-
tems H⊗nA and H⊗nB , respectively. Suppose the
measurement results can be described by n-bit
strings κA and κB .
3. (Error correction) They reconcile the key strings
through an encrypted classical channel consuming
lec-bits of secret key. They agree on an n-bit raw
key string κrec except for a small failure probability
ec.
4. (Privacy amplification) Alice randomly chooses n−
m strings {Vk}k=1,...,n−m of n-bit, which are lin-
early independent, and announces the strings to
Bob. The final key length is n−m, where the k-th
key bit is κrec · Vk. Denote the final key as κfin.
Note that the error correction can be easily conducted
just by classical information theory. The only remaining
concern is to quantize the information leakage m on κrec.
Note that, Eve’s knowledge on κrec will not change af-
ter any operation on HA and HB that keeps Eve’s state
and the raw key bits κrec. Based on this argument, we
construct the following virtual protocol.
Virtual Protocol
1. (State distribution) Alice and Bob share a bipartite
state ρAB ∈ (HA ⊗HB)⊗n.
2. (Squashing) They apply operation Λ on ρAB and
convert it to a key space K⊗n and ancillary space
HR, i.e. Λ(ρAB) ∈ K⊗n ⊗HR.
3. (Measurement) They measure K⊗n on the Z basis
and obtain κrec. They then measure HR by MR.
Suppose the measurement result of MR is γ.
4. (Privacy amplification) They randomly chooses
n − m linearly independent n-bit strings
{Vk}k=1,...,n−m and announce them. The fi-
nal key length is n − m, and the k-th key bit is
κrec · Vk. Denote the final key as κfin.
The operation Λ and measurement MR can be chosen
freely, which are only subjected to the requirement that
the Z-basis measurement statistics on K⊗n is the same
as κrec in actual protocol. Therefore, Eve’s knowledge on
κrec in the virtual protocol is the same as in the actual
protocol. The secrecy of κrec in virtual protocol is the
same as the one in practical protocol.
The core observation in the security proof based on
phase error correction is that, with a proper choice of Λ
and MR, the security of Z-basis measurement result κrec
can be reflected on the predictability of X-basis measure-
ment result Tγ , given the measurement outcome γ onHR.
Denote |Tγ | as the size of possible X-basis measurement
outcomes.
Lemma 1. (Koashi’09 [28]) If the chosen Λ and MR in
the above virtual protocol meets the requirements:
71. The Z-basis measurement statistics on K⊗n is the
same as κrec in actual protocol,
2. Given each measurement outcome γ on HR, the
size of X-basis measurement outcome on K⊗n is
bounded by |Tγ | ≤ 2nξ, except for a small probabil-
ity T ,
then the virtual protocol is
√
′T -secret and ec-correct,
thus (
√
′T + ec)-secure, where 
′
T = T + 2
−nζ and m =
n(ξ + ζ).
Here we collect all the related small failure probabili-
ties,
• ec is the failure probability of error correction, with
affect the correctness of the protocol, which is de-
termined by the method used in the error correction
step;
• T is the failure probability of bounding |Tγ |. Usu-
ally this is the failure probability pe of estimating
phase error number nEX . This amount is deter-
mined by the method used to estimate the phase
error;
• ζ is the extra amount of privacy amplification to en-
hance the privacy of the protocol, which can be de-
termined arbitrarily according to the need for pri-
vacy. Usually we denote pa = 2
−nζ as the failure
probability of privacy amplification.
Usually, we introduce phase error number nEX to char-
acterize the size of |Tγ |. Suppose that, in an ideal case,
the X-basis measurement outcome K⊗n for a given γ is
deterministic T
(0)
γ . Then we can calculate the number
of phase error nEX of given measurement result Tγ from
T
(0)
γ , defined as nEX(Tγ) ≡ wt(Tγ ⊕ T (0)γ ), where wt(A)
is the weight, i.e., number of non-zero elements in string
A, and ⊕ is the modulo-2 addition. Denote nEX as the
maximum value of nEX(Tγ) for a given set {Tγ}. Then
the size of {Tγ} is bounded by
|Tγ | =
nEX∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
<
(
n
nEX + 1
)
< 2nH(
nEX+1
n ), (A8)
where the first inequality holds when (nEX + 1 < n/3)
[9]. The proof of the second inequality can be found in
Ref. [36]. From phase error correction point of view, this
is essentially the typical space argument used in Shan-
non’s theory.
Denote the average phase error number as n¯EX . The
phase error rate is define to be EX ≡ n¯EX/n. Note
that the final key length is n − m, where m = nξ ≥
nH(n
EX+1
n ) = nH(E
X), we conclude that an approxi-
mate proportion H(EX) of raw key bits is sacrificed in
privacy amplification. Taken the reconciliation cose lec
into account, the net key generation length is
K = n−m− lec ≥ n(1−H(EX))− lec. (A9)
One should note that, in Koashi’s security proof, there
is a degree of freedom on choosing the definition of phase
error EX , based on the operation Λ and the ancillary
measurement MR, as long as Lemma 1 holds. This en-
dows a large flexibility when we analyze the security of
QKD.
3. Perfect privacy induced by encoding symmetry
We prove the symmetric-encoding QKD based on the
aforementioned security proof, which essentially general-
izes the one employed in the security proof of PM-QKD
[19]. First, we introduce a general entanglement-based
symmetric-encoding QKD protocol, as shown in Fig. 4.
Here, Alice and Bob share a two-qudit state σAB on sys-
tem A and B, at the beginning of each run. Alice holds
an extra qubit A′ on state |+i〉 initially, and she creates
entanglement between A and A′ by applying the follow-
ing control-U operation
CA′A(U) = |0〉A′ 〈0| ⊗ IA + |1〉A′ 〈1| ⊗ UA. (A10)
She then sends qudit A out to Eve. Similarly, Bob holds
B′, performs CB′B(U) on B and B′, and sends B to
Eve. Eve performs joint measurement on system A and
B to create entanglement on qubit system A′ and B′.
Here, the encoding unitary UA in CA′A(U) meets the
requirement of symmetric encoding,
U2 = U†U = I. (A11)
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FIG. 4. Schematic diagram for a general entanglement-based
version of symmetric-encoding protocol. When σAB is a par-
ity state, then protocol is perfectly private without any infor-
mation leakage.
In that case, the eigenvalue of UA will be either 1 or
−1. Denote the subspaces spanned by the eigenvectors
with eigenvalue 1 and −1 to be the even space HevenA and
the odd space HoddA . For a joint unitary UA ⊗ UB , the
8eigenvalue will also be 1 or −1. The even space and the
odd space of the joint A,B Hilbert space is
HoddAB = (HoddA ⊗HevenB )⊕ (HevenA ⊗HoddB ),
HevenAB = (HoddA ⊗HoddB )⊕ (HevenA ⊗HevenB ).
(A12)
Definition 1. A state ρ on two qudits A,B is an odd
state with respect to UA ⊗ UB iff ρ ∈ HoddAB and an even
state with respect to UA ⊗ UB iff ρ ∈ HevenAB . Both odd
states and even states are called parity states.
Corollary 1. A state ρ keeps invariant under the trans-
formation of UA ⊗ UB, i.e., ρ = UA ⊗ UBρU†A ⊗ U†B, iff
ρ is a mixture of parity states.
Proof. Obviously, the mixture of parity states satisfies
the encoding symmtry ρ = UA ⊗ UBρU†A ⊗ U†B . Here we
prove all the states ρ with encoding symmtry are mixture
of parity states.
Since (UA ⊗ UB)2 = I, the eigenvalue of it should be
either −1 or 1. Denote the eigenbasis of UA ⊗ UB as
{|p, i〉} with eigenvalues {(−1)p}, where p = 0, 1 denotes
the even subspace HevenAB or odd subspace HoddAB , while i
denotes the inner degeneracy in the even or odd subspace.
We expand ρ in the eigenbasis of UA ⊗ UB ,
ρ =
∑
p,q,i,j
cp,q,i,j |p, i〉 〈q, j| . (A13)
Therefore,
UA ⊗ UBρU†A ⊗ U†B =
∑
p,q,i,j
(−1)p−qcp,q,i,j |p, i〉 〈q, j| ,
(A14)
and ρ = UA ⊗ UBρU†A ⊗ U†B implies that
cp,q,i,j = 0 if p 6= q, (A15)
that is, the off diagonal space between odd and even
states is a null space.
Moreover, due to the degeneracy of odd and even sub-
space, it is alway possible to find an eigenbasis of UA⊗UB
as {|p, i〉} to diagonalize the parity states.
We will first consider the following entanglement-based
QKD protocol, and analyze how the symmetry of the
state will preserve QKD privacy.
Protocol I
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob share a known
state σA,B on two qudits A,B, at the beginning of
each run. They initialize their qubits A′, B′ in |+i〉.
Alice applies the control gate CA′A(U) to A
′ and
A. Similarly, Bob applies CB′B(U) to B
′ and B.
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob send the two optical
pulses A and B to an untrusted party, Eve, who
is supposed to perform joint measurement and an-
nounce the detection results. The ideal measure-
ment is to discriminate whether the state is σAB or
(UA ⊗ I)σAB(UA ⊗ I)†.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection result
for each round. Based on Eve’s announcement, Bob
decides whether or not to apply Y operation on his
qubit B′.
4. Sifting: Given a specific announcement of Eve, Al-
ice and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′.
Alice and Bob perform the above steps for many
rounds and end up with a joint 2n-qubit state
ρA′B′ ∈ (HA′ ⊗HB′)⊗n.
5. Key generation: Alice and Bob perform local Z
measurements on ρA′B′ to generate raw data string
κA and κB . They reconcile the key string to κrec
by an encrypted classical channel, with the con-
summation of lec-bit keys. Here we set Alice’s key
as the final reconciled key κA = κrec.
Denote the whole 2n state Alice and Bob share after
the quantum step as ρA′B′ , and the partial-traced state
of the m-th round as ρ
(m)
A′B′ .
Lemma 2. In Protocol I, if the optical state σ Alice and
Bob share during the m-th run is an odd state, then the
two-qubit state Alice and Bob finally obtain, ρ
(m)
A′B′ , is in
the subspace spanned by {Φ+,Ψ−}; and if σ is an even
state, then ρ
(m)
A′B′ is in the subspace spanned by {Φ−,Ψ+}.
Here m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proof. First consider the pure state σ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|. The
joint state on system A′, B′, A,B before the C(pi) opera-
tions is
|+i+ i〉A′B′ |ψ〉AB =
1
2
[(|00〉−|11〉)+i(|01〉+|10〉)]A′B′ |ψ〉AB .
(A16)
Note that for odd state |ψo〉AB ,
UA ⊗ UB |ψo〉AB = − |ψo〉AB ,
UA ⊗ IB |ψo〉AB = −IA ⊗ UB |ψo〉AB ,
(A17)
and for even state |ψe〉AB ,
UA ⊗ UB |ψe〉AB = |ψe〉AB ,
UA ⊗ IB |ψe〉AB = IA ⊗ UB |ψe〉AB ,
(A18)
Therefore, for odd pure state |ψo〉 input, the state after
the CA′A(U)⊗ CB′B(U) operations is
9|Ψo〉 = CA′A(U)⊗ CB′B(U)(1
2
[(|00〉 − |11〉) + i(|01〉+ |10〉)]A′B′ |ψo〉AB)
=
1
2
{[|00〉A′B′ − |11〉A′B′ (UA ⊗ UB)] + i[|01〉A′B′ (UA ⊗ IB) + |10〉A′B′ (IA ⊗ UB(pi)]} |ψo〉AB
=
1
2
[(|00〉+ |11〉)A′B′ |ψo〉AB + i(|01〉 − |10〉)A′B′(UA ⊗ IB) |ψo〉AB ],
(A19)
and for even pure state |ψe〉 input, the state after the CA′A(U)⊗ CB′B(U) operations is
|Ψe〉 = CA′A(U)⊗ CB′B(U)(1
2
[(|00〉 − |11〉) + i(|01〉+ |10〉)]A′B′ |ψe〉AB)
=
1
2
{[|00〉A′B′ − |11〉A′B′ (UA ⊗ UB)] + i[|01〉A′B′ (UA ⊗ IB) + |10〉A′B′ (IA ⊗ UB(pi)]} |ψe〉AB
=
1
2
[(|00〉 − |11〉)A′B′ |ψe〉AB + i(|01〉+ |10〉)A′B′(UA ⊗ IB) |ψe〉AB ],
(A20)
For the odd state case, if we partially trace out sys-
tem A,B in |Ψo〉, the state ρ(m)A′,B′ is in the subspace of
{Φ+,Ψ−}. Whatever Eve’s announcement afterward is,
the possible operation on ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is either IA′ ⊗ IB′ or
IA′ ⊗ YB′ . Note that (IA′ ⊗ YB′) |Φ+〉 = |Ψ−〉, hence the
state ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is still in the subspace of {Φ+,Ψ−}. Simi-
larly, for the even state case, the state ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the
subspace of {Φ−,Ψ+}.
For general mixed states, we can regard them as mix-
tures of pure parity states,
σodd =
∑
i
pi
∣∣∣ψ(i)o 〉〈ψ(i)o ∣∣∣ ,
σeven =
∑
i
pi
∣∣∣ψ(i)e 〉〈ψ(i)e ∣∣∣ . (A21)
This is equivalent to Charlie sending out
∣∣∣ψ(i)o(e)〉 with
probability pi. For each odd pure state component, the
left qubit state ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the subspace of {Φ+,Ψ−},
therefore their mixture are still in this subspace. Similar
arguments hold for the even parity states.
If the state ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the subspace of {Φ+,Ψ−}, then
the measurement value of X ⊗X and Z ⊗ Z are always
the same; on the contrary, if ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the subspace of
{Φ−,Ψ+}, then the measurement value of X ⊗ X and
Z ⊗ Z are always different. From Shor-Preskill’s view,
when we detect the Z-basis error location, we can apply
IA′ ⊗ YB′ operation to correct the X-basis error and Z-
basis error simultaneously, thus the error correction can
be taken only once.
Following the method in Ref. [28], we construct a vir-
tual protocol, named Protocol Ia, and there is a freedom
to choose the definition of phase error. The information
leakage can be characterized by the phase error with an
optimized definition.
Protocol Ia
1. With the same manner, Alice and Bob perform the
steps 1∼4 in Protocol I for many rounds and end
up with a joint 2n-qubit state ρA′B′ .
2. Key generation: Alice and Bob first perform
a control-(−Z) gate on each round of state
{ρ(m)A′B′}nm=1. After that, Bob perform local X mea-
surements on system B′ with measurement out-
come γB′ , and Alice perform local Z measurements
to obtain the final key κrec.
Denote the control-(−Z) gate as C(−Z)A′,B′ , then
C(−Z)A′,B′ = |0〉A′ 〈0| ⊗ I + |1〉A′ 〈1| ⊗ (−Z) (A22)
Note that
C(−Z)A′,B′
∣∣Φ+〉 = ∣∣Φ+〉 , C(−Z)A′,B′ ∣∣Φ−〉 = ∣∣Φ−〉 ,
C(−Z)A′,B′
∣∣Ψ+〉 = ∣∣Ψ−〉 , C(−Z)A′,B′ ∣∣Ψ−〉 = ∣∣Ψ+〉 .
(A23)
Since control-(−Z) gate commutes with Z-
measurement on system A′, applying control-(−Z)
gate will note affect the Z-measurement outcome.
Therefore, Alice’s Z-measurement results κrec should be
the same as the one in Protocol I, and the information
leakage of κrec to Eve is the same.
If σ is an odd state, then ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the subspace
spanned by {Φ+,Ψ−}. After Alice and Bob apply
C(−Z)A′,B′ gate, ρ(m)A′,B′ is in the subspace spanned by
{Φ+,Ψ+}. Note that
(XA′ ⊗XB′)
∣∣Φ+〉 = (XA′ ⊗XB′) ∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1, (A24)
therefore, after the C(−Z)A′,B′ gate, the X-basis mea-
surement result on system A′ andB′ should always be the
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same. If we set the outcome γB′ as the correct X-basis
measurement result of B′, then the phase error number
is 0.
Similarly, if σ is a even state, then ρ
(m)
A′,B′ is in the
subspace spanned by {Φ−,Ψ+}. After Alice and Bob
apply C(−Z)A′,B′ gate, ρ(m)A′,B′ is in the subspace spanned
by {Φ+,Ψ+}. Note that
(XA′ ⊗XB′)
∣∣Φ−〉 = (XA′ ⊗XB′) ∣∣Ψ−〉 = −1, (A25)
therefore, after the C(−Z)A′,B′ gate, the X-basis mea-
surement results on system A′ and B′ should always be
different. If we set −γB′ as the correct X-basis measure-
ment result of A′, then the phase error number is 0.
Definition 2. In Protocol Ia, define the observed value
1
2 (1 − 〈XA′ ⊗XB′〉) to be the odd phase error rate EXo ,
and 12 (1 + 〈XA′ ⊗XB′〉) to be the even phase error rate
EXe .
Note that EXe = 1 − EXo . We have the following ob-
servation,
Observation 1. In Protocol Ia, for an odd(even) state
input σ, the odd(even) phase error rate is always 0. That
is, if Alice measures system A′ on X-basis instead of
Z-basis, then the measurement results is certain, given
Bob’s measurement outcome γB′ on system B
′.
In the phase-error-based proof, we may choose the def-
inition of phase error EX as long as the requirements in
Lemma 1 hold. Therefore, the odd states and even states
σ are both be the perfect source for Protocol I, with per-
fect privacy.
The case will become nontrivial when Alice and Bob
hold a mixture of odd and even states. The overall phase
error rate cannot be zero, regardless of whether odd or
even phase error definition is applied.
We write the state σAB shared by Alice and Bob as
σAB =
∑
i
p(i)o
∣∣∣ψ(i)o 〉
AB
〈
ψ(i)o
∣∣∣+∑
j
p(j)e
∣∣∣ψ(j)e 〉
AB
〈
ψ(j)e
∣∣∣ ,
(A26)
with
∑
i p
(i)
o +
∑
j p
(j)
e = 1. Introduce the purification of
σ,
|Ψ〉PAB =
∑
i
√
p
(i)
o |o, i〉P
∣∣∣ψ(i)o 〉
AB
+
∑
j
√
p
(j)
e |e, j〉P
∣∣∣ψ(j)e 〉
AB
, (A27)
here system P is a register to store the parity informa-
tion. Suppose {|p, i〉P } is an orthogonal basis such that〈p, i|q, j|p, i|q, j〉 = δpqδij , with p = o, e denotes the par-
ity of the according state, and i denotes the index of
odd/even pure states. Such basis is defined as Z-basis of
system P .
Here we consider two cases, where Eve’s knowledge on
σAB are different. First, we consider the case when Eve’s
state is decoupled from σAB at the beginning, that is,
ρABE = σAB ⊗ ρE . That is to say, Eve doesn’t hold
the purified system P , and we can virtually imagine that
system P is hold by Alice and Bob. In Fig. 5 we draw
the whole Protocol Ia with the ancillary P presents. In
Koashi’s proof, when we characterize Eve’s knowledge
on Alice’s final Z-basis measurement results on A′ κrec,
we transform the problem to how Alice can predict the
X-basis measurement result γ in the presence of system
B′ and P . In this case, Alice can learn the parity infor-
mation of each single round from the measurement result
of P , where Alice can flip her X-basis measurement re-
sult on K to match γ if the parity is not accordance with
the definition choice of phase error. Therefore, by Obser-
vation 1 above, Alice can perfectly predict the X-basis
measurement result. Applying Lemma 1, we prove the
perfect privacy of parity states.
Theorem 1. In Protocol I and Ia, if Alice and Bob share
a mixture of odd and even state σAB at the beginning
of each run, and Eve’s state ρE is decoupled from σAB,
i.e., ρABE = σAB ⊗ ρE, then Eve has no information
on Alice’s Z-basis measurement result κrec, i.e. perfect
privacy.
Now we consider the case when Eve holds the purifi-
cation of σAB . We consider the following protocol.
Protocol Ib
1. With the same manner, Alice and Bob perform the
steps 1∼4 in Protocol I for many rounds and end
up with a joint 2n-qubit state ρA′B′ . After that,
Alice and Bob send the purified system P of each
run to Eve.
2. Key generation: Alice and Bob first perform
a control-(−Z) gate on each round of state
{ρ(m)A′B′}nm=1. After that, Bob perform local X mea-
surements on system B′ with measurement out-
come γB′ , and Alice perform local Z measurements
to obtain the final key κrec.
In Protocol Ib, a weaker version of Protocol I, Alice
and Bob no longer holds the system P , which makes them
unable to discriminate the parity information, and their
ability to predict Tγ is weakened. However, an impor-
tant observation is that, due to system P is sent to Eve
after her announcement, the announcement result must
be independent of system P , in which case, for a fixed
Eve’s measurement strategy, the state ρA′B′ in Protocol
Ia and Ib will be the same.
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FIG. 5. Schematic diagram for the whole Protocol Ia/Ib when the input state is a general mixed parity state σAB . Here we
post-select the rounds when Eve announces effective clicks. Alice and Bob prepare n-rounds of state |Ψ〉PAB in Eq. (A27).
They performs the PM-QKD encoding by applying C(U) gates on system A′, A and B′, B, as is illustrated in Fig. 4. After
that, they send system A,B to Eve, and performs IA′B′ or IA′ ⊗ YB′ operation on each round of system A′, B′. They apply
C(−Z) gates on A′, B′, and measure them by ZA′ ⊗XB′ to get strings κrec, γ. In Protocol Ib, after Eve’s announcement, they
send system P to Eve. In phase-error-based proof, Eve’s knowledge on κrec can be characterized by Alice’s knowledge on her
X-basis measurement result Tγ on A
′.
In another aspect, without the assistance of parity in-
formation in P , Alice and Bob cannot deal with the odd
and even rounds separately, and there is no longer perfect
privacy. Alice’s knowledge on Tγ given γ is characterized
by the overall odd or even phase error. For the clicked n
rounds, if we measure the system P on Z-basis, and there
are neven rounds with even parity measurement results.
Then the overall odd phase error rate is
EXo =
neven
n
. (A28)
From now on, We define the phase error Eph as the
odd phase error rate EXo . As an expense to realize parity
states by independent phase randomization with phase
announcement, we cannot discriminate even and odd
components any more, and should use a unified phase er-
ror definition, while Eve’s announcement strategy is un-
changed, and the local state ρA′B′ also keeps unchanged,
which indicates that Protocol Ia and Protocol Ib are the
same except in parity discrimination.
Appendix B: Security proof of PM-QKD
Here we present security proof of PM-QKD, by reduc-
ing it to the symmetric-encoding QKD mentioned above.
Especially, we use the decoy method to monitor the phase
error number nEX in real experimental setting to deter-
mine how much proportion of raws keys should be sac-
rificed to enhance the total privacy. First, we introduce
the notation used in the proof.
The qudit system A considered in Appendix A is on an
optical mode, whose creation operator is a† and Hilbert
space is denoted as HA. A k-photon Fock state |k〉A is
defined as
|k〉A ≡
(a†)k√
k!
|0〉A , (B1)
where |0〉A is the vacuum state. A coherent state |α〉A is
defined as
|α〉A ≡ e−
1
2 |α|2
∞∑
k=0
αk√
k!
|k〉A (B2)
The photon number of |α〉A follows a Poisson distribution
Pµ(k) = e
−µµk/k!, where µ = |α|2 is the mean photon
number, also the light intensity. In the following proof,
we specifically select
U = UA = UB = e
ipia†a (B3)
, which satisfies the condition U2 = I. When applied on
a Fock state |n〉, this operation adds an additional phase
(−1)n, which has no effect on even-photon Fock states,
while changes the phase of odd-photon Fock states. As a
result, we have the folowing corollary.
Corollary 2. A state ρ on two modes A,B is an odd
(even) state with respect to UA ⊗ UB iff ΠˆoρΠˆo = ρ
(ΠˆeρΠˆe = ρ). Πˆo and Πˆe are the projectors of the odd
and even subspace respectively, which are defined as
Πˆo =
∑
m+n:odd
|m,n〉AB 〈m,n| ,
Πˆe =
∑
m+n:even
|m,n〉AB 〈m,n| ,
(B4)
where {|m,n〉A,B}m,n are the Fock basis on optical modes
A and B.
12
1. Phase randomization and parity state
To generate a mixture of parity states, we introduce
the “twirling” operation,
E(σAB) = 1
2
σAB +
1
2
(UA ⊗ UB)σAB(UA ⊗ UB)†, (B5)
Note that E(σAB) keeps invariant under the transfor-
mation UA ⊗ UB , and therefore is a mixture of parity
state for any state σAB on two optical modes A and B
according to Corollary 1. To implement E in PM-QKD,
Alice and Bob can first randomize their systems A,B
with random phase φa and φb independently, announce
the random phase, and post-select the runs with the same
random phase after Eve’s detection announcements. PM-
QKD with independant randomization is summarized as
Protocol II below.
Protocol II
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob share a known
state σAB on two optical mode A,B, at the begin-
ning of each run. They initialize their qubits A′, B′
in |+i〉. Alice applies the control gate CA′A(U) to
qubit A′ and optical pulse A, and adds an extra
random 0/pi phase φa on A. Similarly, Bob applies
CB′B(U), φb to B
′ and B.
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob send the two optical
pulses A and B to an untrusted party, Eve, who is
supposed to perform joint measurement and obtain
the detection results L or R, which is expected to
be projective measuremnt on the basis E(σAB) and
(UA ⊗ I)E(σAB)(UA ⊗ I)†. However, this is no an
assumption or requirement of the measurement of
Eve, as an untrusted party.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection result
or no successful detection for each round. After
that, Alice and Bob announce their random phases
φa and φb.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L or R click, Alice
and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′. In
addition, Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit B′
if Eve’s announcement is R click. If |φa − φb| = pi,
Bob applies another Pauli Y -gate on B′.
Alice and Bob perform the above steps for many
rounds and end up with a joint 2n-qubit state
ρA′B′ ∈ (HA′ ⊗HB′)⊗n.
5. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob estimate the
click ratios caused by even state fractions.
6. Key generation: Alice and Bob perform local Z
measurements on ρA′B′ to generate raw data string
κA and κB . They reconcile the key string to κA by
an encrypted classical channel, with the consum-
mation of lec-bit keys. After that, they perform
privacy amplification according to the even state
ratio to generate keys.
In Protocol II, the signals with |φa−φb| = pi can also be
used if Bob performs extra YB′ gate on system B
′ before
the key generation step [19]. Besides the independant
randomization, the Protocol II is the same as Protocol
I, which indicates that the security of Protocol II can
be reduced to Protocol I, and the information leakage in
Protocol II can be bounded by the phase error rate, EXo ,
which is introduced in Protocol Ib, an weaker form of
Protocol I. The problem of independent randomization
is analyzed in the following text.
In the protocol, Alice and Bob have to announce φa, φb
publicly to post-select the runs with the same random
phase φa = φb. As is analyzed in Ref. [19], the random
phase φa, φb is correlated to the key information, which
can be utilized by Eve. To model the information leak-
age caused by random phase announcement, consider the
case where Alice and Bob share a pure state |ψ〉AB . In a
purified scenario, suppose a qubit register P is initialized
in the state |+〉, then Alice and Bob realize E with
|Ψ〉PAB = U(|+〉P |ψ〉AB)
=
1√
2
(|+〉P |ψ〉AB + |−〉P (UA(pi)⊗ UB(pi)) |ψ〉AB),
= |0〉P
∣∣ψ¯e〉AB + |1〉P ∣∣ψ¯o〉AB
=
√
pe |0〉P |ψe〉AB +
√
po |1〉P |ψo〉AB ,
(B6)
where∣∣ψ¯e〉AB = 12(|ψ〉AB + (UA ⊗ UB) |ψ〉AB),∣∣ψ¯o〉AB = 12(|ψ〉AB − (UA ⊗ UB) |ψ〉AB).
(B7)
Here
∣∣ψ¯e〉AB , ∣∣ψ¯o〉AB are unnormalized even and
odd state, where pe =
〈
ψ¯e|ψ¯e
∣∣ψ¯e|ψ¯e〉 and po =〈
ψ¯o|ψ¯o
∣∣ψ¯o|ψ¯o〉.
Therefore, the register P records whether pi-
modulation is applied by X-basis state |±〉, while the
parity information of the state is kept in the Z-basis
state |0/1〉 of the register, as shown in the equation given
above.
In this scenario, phase announcement can be inter-
preted as the following process: Alice and Bob prepare
|Ψ〉PAB , as a purification of E(σAB), and measure system
P on X-basis, followed by announcing the result to Eve
after the detection announcement. In a worse case, we
can reduce the protocol to Protocol Ib, where Eve holds
the system P after her detection announcement.
To conclude, PM-QKD protocol can be realized by any
initial state σAB with the assist of a phase randomization,
at the expense of losing the capability of distinguishing
parity components.
2. PM-QKD based on coherent state
So far, we don’t make any assumption on the struc-
ture of initial state σAB . Here, we focus on one specific
13
M
|+i〉
0 , π
0 , π
|+i〉
A’
A
B
B’
Eve
M
L
R
#$
#%
σ'({
FIG. 6. Realistic PM-QKD protocol with extra 0/pi-phase randomization. σAB is a generic state on optical modes A and B.
φa, φb are two random phases which is either 0 or pi. In practice, the phase can be absorbed into the controlled-U(pi) operations
afterwards.
implementation. Due to the fact that coherent states
are easy to implement in experiments, we set σAB as
∣∣√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣√µbeiδ〉B . After the twirling phase random-
ization, the state becomes
ρ =
1
2
(|√µa〉A 〈
√
µa| ⊗
∣∣√µbeiδ〉B 〈√µbeiδ∣∣+ |−√µa〉A 〈−√µa| ⊗ ∣∣−√µbeiδ〉B 〈−√µbeiδ∣∣)
= peven
∣∣ψδe(µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψδe(µa, µb)∣∣+ podd ∣∣ψδo(µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψδo(µa, µb)∣∣ , (B8)
where
∣∣ψδe(µa, µb)〉AB = 1√peven (|√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣√µbeiδ〉B + |−√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣−√µbeiδ〉B),∣∣ψδo(µa, µb)〉AB = 1√podd (|√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣√µbeiδ〉B − |−√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣−√µbeiδ〉B),
(B9)
Here the probabilities peven, podd are the normalization
factors. In the case where δ = 0, the initial state is an
unbiased mixing of
∣∣√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣√µb〉B and ∣∣−√µa〉A ⊗∣∣−√µb〉B , in which case the even and odd components is
ρe(µa, µb) =
1
2
(
∣∣ψ0e(µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψ0e(µa, µb)∣∣+ |ψpie (µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψpie (µa, µb)|),
ρo(µa, µb) =
1
2
(
∣∣ψ0o(µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψ0o(µa, µb)∣∣+ |ψpio (µa, µb)〉AB 〈ψpio (µa, µb)|). (B10)
Note that ρe(µa, µb) (ρo(µa, µb)) is only comprised of
even (odd)-phton Fock states, and therefore in even (odd)
subspace.
In the final key distillation steps, we deal with the runs
with φa = φb and |φa−φb| = pi together, and the overall
phase error rate Eph is given by the fraction of clicks
caused by even components ρe(µa, µb). To estimate the
even clicks, we only need to estimate the yield Yeven, i.e.
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the detection probability when Alice and Bob send the
state ρe(µa, µb). The phase error rate E
ph is
Eph =
pevenYeven
Qµa,µb
. (B11)
Here, the only task remained is to estimate Yeven, as
Qµa,µb given experiment parameters and data. peven de-
scribes the proportion of even photon rounds, which re-
lated to the intensities µa, µb.
3. Phase error estimation and continuous
randomization
As a common technique, decoy state method [30–32]
can be applied to estimate the value of Yeven. The core
of decoy state method is to use a set of testing states to
learn Eve’s behavior on specific components in the signal
states. The decoy is based on the observation that, if
the same components appears in both the (mixed) signal
states and the (mixed) testing states, Eve cannot attack
on them with different manners in principle. In this sec-
tion, we consider the asymptotic case with n → ∞, so
that there is no statistical fluctuation. The finite-size
analysis is in Appendix C.
For the simplicity of discussion, we assume that µa =
µb = µ/2. The following argument can be easily gener-
alize to the cased when µa 6= µb. Denote the fraction of
odd- and even-labeled clicked rounds as
qodd =
nodd
n
; qeven =
neven
n
. (B12)
According to Eq. (B10), the signal source is combined by
|ψe〉 and |ψo〉 with probability of peven and podd,
ρ = pµoddρo(
µ
2
,
µ
2
) + pµevenρe(
µ
2
,
µ
2
), (B13)
Here we add superscript µ to the probabilities and states,
since they are the functions of µ. The core is to estimate
the detection probability of ρe(
µ
2 ,
µ
2 ), namely, the yield
Y µeven.
The fraction of odd- and even-parity states in the final
detected signal is given by
qµodd = p
µ
odd
Y µodd
Qµ
,
qµeven = p
µ
even
Y µeven
Qµ
,
(B14)
where Qµ is the total gain of the signals. For signals with
intensity µ, we have
Qµ = pµoddY
µ
odd + p
µ
evenY
µ
even. (B15)
To efficiently estimate qodd and qeven, Alice and Bob
adjust the intensity µ of their prepared coherent lights.
With constraints from different intensities,
Qµ = pµoddY
µ
odd + p
µ
evenY
µ
even,
Qν = pνoddY
ν
odd + p
ν
evenY
ν
even,
(B16)
we have better estimation of Y µodd and Y
µ
even. Note that
Y µodd, Y
µ
even is dependent on the intensity µ. For different
signal intensities µ, ν, the difference of yield Y µodd, Y
µ
even
is bounded by
|Y µodd − Y νodd| ≤
√
1− F 2µν , (B17)
where Fµν is the fidelity between the odd state |ψo〉 with
intensities µ and ν, respectively,
Fµν = Tr[
√√
ρµoddρ
ν
odd
√
ρµodd]. (B18)
In order to obtain a tighter bound on the estimation
of Y µeven, we can introduce extra phases other than {0, pi}
for coherent states
∣∣∣√µ/2〉
A
⊗
∣∣∣√µ/2〉
B
. As an extreme
case, one choice is to randomize the phase continuously
from 0 to 2pi, i.e. continuous randomization. Note that,
for a coherent state,
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∣∣√µeiφ〉 〈√µeiφ∣∣ = ∞∑
k=0
Pµ(k) |k〉 〈k| , (B19)
where Pµ(k) = e
−µ µk
k! is the proportion of Fock state |k〉
in the mixed states.
If we randomize the phase of two coherent pulses si-
multaneously, for states with |φa − φb| = δ, we have
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∣∣∣√µ/2eiφ〉
A
〈√
µ/2eiφ
∣∣∣⊗ ∣∣∣√µ/2ei(φ+δ)〉
B
〈√
µ/2ei(φ+δ)
∣∣∣ = ∞∑
k=0
Pµ(k)
∣∣k¯δ〉
AB
〈
k¯δ
∣∣ , (B20)
the k-photon state
∣∣k¯δ〉
AB
is
∣∣k¯δ〉
AB
=
(a† + eiδb†)k√
2kk!
|00〉AB . (B21)
Consider the simultaneous randomization and the key
encoding process, the total phase difference of Alice and
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Bob’s coherent state can be φa = φb or |φa − φb| = pi,
which indicates the mixed k-photon state, which is sent
to Eve, is
ρk =
1
2
(
∣∣k¯0〉
AB
〈
k¯0
∣∣+ ∣∣k¯pi〉
AB
〈
k¯pi
∣∣), (B22)
which is independent of the intensity µ. In this case,
the state Alice and Bob send out can be regarded as a
probabilistic mixture of mixed k-photon state ρk. By
directly applying Lemma 2, we can estimate the phase
error by
Eph =
∞∑
k=0
q2k, (B23)
where qk is the proportion of detection event caused by
state ρAB , especially q0 corresponds to the vacuum signal
detection, i.e. dark counts.
The source components are Fock states {|k〉}, whose
yields {Yk} are independent of µ. The fractions qµk of k-
photon component in the final detected signals are given
by
qµk = P
µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
. (B24)
The overall gain is given by
Qµ =
∞∑
k=0
Pµ(k)Yk, (B25)
Similarly, we use decoy state method in continuous ran-
domization case, and there is a set of (B25) with different
signal intensities µ and corresponding proportion Pµ(k),
which can be used to bound {Yk}, therefore we can esti-
mate Eph efficiently.
The continuous phase-randomized protocol, named
Protocol III, is as follows,
Protocol III
1. State preparation: Alice and Bob prepares coherent
states
∣∣√µa〉A⊗∣∣√µb〉B on two optical modes A,B,
at the beginning of each run. They initialize their
qubits A′, B′ in |+i〉. Alice applies the control gate
CA′A(U) to qubit A
′ and optical pulse A, and add
an extra random 0 ∼ 2pi phase φa on A. Similarly,
Bob applies CB′B(U), φb to B
′ and B.
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob send the two optical
pulses A and B to an untrusted party, Eve, who is
supposed to perform joint measurement and obtain
the detection results L or R.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult or no successful detection for each round. After
that, Alice and Bob announce their random phases
and intensity settings {φa, µa} and {φb, µb} and
keep the signals with |φa − φb| = 0/pi and µa = µb.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′. In
addition, Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit B′
if Eve’s announcement is R click. If |φa − φb| = pi,
Bob applies another Pauli Y -gate on B′.
Alice and Bob perform the above steps for many
rounds and end up with a joint 2n-qubit state
ρA′B′ ∈ (HA′ ⊗HB′)⊗n.
5. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob estimate the
click ratio caused by even state fractions by decoy-
state methods.
6. Key generation: For the signals with intensity
µa = µb = µ/2, Alice and Bob perform local Z
measurements on ρA′B′ to generate raw data string
κA and κB . They reconcile the key string to κA by
an encrypted classical channel, with the consum-
mation of lec-bit keys. After that, they perform
privacy amplification according to the even state
ratio to generate keys.
4. Practical issues in PM-QKD
In practice, to bound the phase error, we only need to
bound the yield of single-photon components ρ1,
ρ1 =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|), (B26)
and the overall odd phase error rate is bounded by
Eph ≤ 1− q1, (B27)
where q1 = Pµ(1)Y1/Qµ.
To make the above Protocol III practical, we now con-
sider the following issues.
1. From continuous phase randomization to discrete
phase randomization.
A continuous phase randomization and phase post-
selection is practically intractable. However, in
practice, randomizing the phases of coherent pulses
discretely is enough. For a coherent state
∣∣√µ〉,
if we randomize its phase discretely with {φj =
2pi
D j}D−1j=0 , the state can be expanded by a group of
“pseudo” Fock state[34],
1
D
D−1∑
j=0
∣∣√µeiφj〉
C
〈√
µeiφj
∣∣ = D−1∑
k=0
PµD(k) |λk〉C 〈λk| ,
(B28)
where
|λk〉C =
e−µ/2√
Pµ(k)
∞∑
l=0
(
√
µ)lD+k√
(lD + k)!
|lD + k〉C ,
PµD(k) =
∞∑
l=0
µlD+ke−µ
(lD + k)!
,
(B29)
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as we can see, when D becomes large, |λ0〉 and |λ1〉
will get close to the Fock state |0〉 and |1〉.
Now we calculate the deviation of q1 caused by dis-
crete phase randomization. Without loss of gener-
ality, we set |φa−φb| = δ. After the discrete phase
randomization, the state is
1
D
D−1∑
j=0
∣∣∣∣√µ2 eiφj
〉
A
〈√
µ
2
eiφj
∣∣∣∣⊗ ∣∣∣∣√µ2 ei(φj+δ)
〉
B
〈√
µ
2
ei(φj+δ)
∣∣∣∣ = ∞∑
k=0
PµD(k)
∣∣λ¯δk〉AB 〈λ¯δk∣∣ , (B30)
the k-photon state
∣∣λ¯δk〉AB is
∣∣λ¯δk〉AB = e−µ/2√Pµ(k)
∞∑
l=0
(
√
µ)lD+k√
(lD + k)!
∣∣∣lD + kδ〉
AB
,
(B31)
where
∣∣k¯δ〉
AB
is defined in Eq. (B21).
We compare the fidelity between
∣∣1¯δ〉
AB
and∣∣λ¯δ1〉AB ,
| 〈1¯δ|λ¯δ1∣∣1¯δ|λ¯δ1〉 |2 = e−µPµD(1)
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
l=0
(
√
µ)lD+1
(lD + 1)!
〈
1¯δ|lD + 1δ
∣∣∣1¯δ|lD + 1δ〉∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
e−µ
PµD(1)
µ
=
e−µµ
e−µ(µ+ µ
(D+1)
(D+1)! +
µ(2D+1)
(2D+1)! + ...)
=
1
1 + µ
D
(D+1)! +
µ2D
(2D+1)! + ...
≥ 1− µ
D
(D + 1)!
,
(B32)
the final inequality holds because ((n+1)D+1)! ≥
(nD + 1)!(D + 1)! for n ≥ 1. Note that the fidelity
is independent of the phase difference δ.
Therefore, according to Eq. (B17), the yield differ-
ence of
∣∣1˜δ〉 and ∣∣λ¯δ1〉AB is bounded by
|Y1 − Y µλ1 | ≤
√
1− | 〈1¯δ|λ¯δ1∣∣1¯δ|λ¯δ1〉 |2 ≤
√
µD
(D + 1)!
,
(B33)
then the difference between estimated
∣∣λ¯δ1〉AB frac-
tion, denoted by q1 and q
µ
λ1
, is bounded by
|q1−qµλ1 | ≤ P
µ
D(1)
|Y1 − Y µλ1 |
Qµ
≤ P
µ
D(1)
Qµ
√
µD
(D + 1)!
=
ξD(µ)
Qµ
,
(B34)
note that ξD(µ) ≡ PµD(1)
√
µD
(D+1)! ≈ µ
D/2+1e−µ√
(D+1)!
,
which is only correlated to the signal intensity µ
and discrete phase number D. Therefore, we can
compare the ratio ξD(µ)/Qµ, which illustrates the
deviation of the estimated q1 from the real q
µ
λ1
.
If we set D = 16, then ξD(µ) ≈ µ
9e−µ√
17!
, which is a
tiny value when µ < 1, comparing to the gain Qµ ≈
ηµ, where η is the channel transmittance from Alice
or Bob to the middle point Eve. Therefore, we
can safely ignore the effect caused by discrete phase
randomization and borrow the former decoy-state
method based on continuous phase randomization
[31, 37].
2. Key generation and parameter estimation with the
signals which the phases are not aligned.
In Protocol III, only the states with aligned phases
|φa−φb| = 0, pi and the same intensity µa = µb will
be post-selected to estimate the detections caused
by single-photon components and generate keys.
This will cause a huge waste on sifting in a prac-
tical finite-size case. We now discuss how to use
this signals for key generation and parameter esti-
mation.
First, we notice that for signals with µa = µb = µ/2
and |φa−φb| = δ, δ+pi, we can regard it as a specific
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case of Protocol III, where Alice and Bob originally
share a state
∣∣√µa〉A ⊗ ∣∣√µbeiδ〉B . According to
Eq. (B21), the mixed k-photon state when |φa −
φb| = δ, δ + pi is
ρδk =
1
2
(
∣∣k¯δ〉
AB
〈
k¯δ
∣∣+ ∣∣k¯δ+pi〉
AB
〈
k¯δ+pi
∣∣). (B35)
In general, the k-photon state is correlated with the
misaligned phase δ, which implies that states with
different mismatched phases have different mixed
k-photon states. However, this state is not true for
k − 1, where the single-photon state
ρδ1 =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|), (B36)
is independent of the misaligned phase. Therefore,
states with different unaligned phases has the same
single-photon component, which indicates that we
can use all of states to estimate the yield of single-
photon component, regardless of the misaligned
phase δ. The phase error can be bounded by
Eph ≤ 1− q1. (B37)
Based on this observation, during the post-
processing, Alice and Bob first reconcile their sifted
raw key bits Ka and Kb with for each group js =
ja−jb separately. If the error rate in a group of data
is too large, they can simply discard that group.
Denote the group set J to be the set of remain-
ing phase group indexes {js}. That is, if js ∈ J ,
then the phase group js is kept for key generation.
They then estimate the even photon fraction qeven
for all the remaining data in J and perform privacy
amplification.
In a more general scenario, Alice and Bob can esti-
mate the yield of state |01〉AB and |10〉AB , denoted
as Y01 and Y10, respectively. The overall yield Y1
can be calculated by
Y1 =
1
2
(Y01 + Y10). (B38)
Similar to the traditional MDI-QKD [13, 38, 39],
Alice and Bob can use signals with different inten-
sities to achieve a better estimation on Y1. How-
ever, in this article, to simplify the discussion, we
will focus the signals with µa = µb, and leave the
tighter estimation for future works.
3. From infinite decoy state analysis to finite decoy
state setting.
In practice, with finite data size, we can use only
finite rounds for testing. To accurately bound the
even state components, we have to use the testing
states with finite intensity settings.
We will explicitly analyze this problem in Ap-
pendix C. As a result, we will show that Alice and
Bob can use only vacuum + weak decoy state, sim-
ilar to the BB84 decoy state analysis [37].
With all the factors taken into consideration, the prac-
tical version of Protocol III, named Protocol IV, is pre-
sented as below.
Protocol IV
1. State preparation: Alice prepares coherent state∣∣√µaeiφja 〉A on optical mode A, with µa ∈
{0, ν/2, µ/2}, and φja ∈ { 2piD ja}D−1ja=0. She initializes
her qubit A′ in |+i〉. She applies the control gate
CA′A(U) to qubit A
′ and optical pulse A. Simi-
larly, Bob prepares
∣∣√µbeiφjb 〉B on optical mode
B. He initializes his qubit B′ in |+i〉. He applies
the control gate CB′B(U) to qubit B
′ and optical
pulse B.
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob send their optical
pulses, A and B, to an untrusted party, Eve, who is
expected to perform an interference measurement
and record the detector (L or R) that clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult or no successful detection for each round. Af-
ter that, Alice and Bob announce their random
phases and intensity settings {ja, µa} and {jb, µb}
and keep the signals with µa = µb.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces an L/R click, Alice
and Bob keep the qubits of systems A′ and B′. In
addition, Bob applies a Pauli Y -gate to his qubit
B′ if Eve’s announcement is R click. If 3D4 > [(ja−
jb) mod D] ≥ D4 , Bob applies another Pauli Y -gate
on B′.
Alice and Bob perform the above steps for many
rounds and end up with a joint 2n-qubit state
ρA′B′ ∈ (HA′ ⊗HB′)⊗n.
5. Parameter estimation: For all the raw data that
they have retained, Alice and Bob record the detect
number M
(js)
ia,ib
of different intensity combinations
{µia , µib} and phase groups js. They then estimate
the information leakage Ephµ using Eq. (B27).
6. Key generation: For the signals with intensity
µa = µb = µ/2, Alice and Bob perform local
Z measurements on ρA′B′ to generate raw data
string κA and κB . They first group the signals by
js = min[(ja − jb) mod D, (jb − ja) mod D]. Af-
ter that, they keep the signals with js in a set J .
They reconcile the corresponding key string to κA
by an encrypted classical channel, with the con-
summation of ljsec-bit keys according to js. After
that, they perform privacy amplification according
to the estimated single-photon ratio q1 to generate
keys.
The key rate of this protocol is
r =
2
D
∑
js∈J
[
1−H(Eph)− ljsec
]
. (B39)
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Typically, ljsec can be replaced by fH(E
js), where f is
error correction efficiency and Ejs is bit error rate for
each phase group js that is in J . E
ph is the phase error
rate bounded by Eq. (B37).
Following Shor and Preskill [5], we can move the mea-
surement before the sifting step, in which case C − pi
rotation is replaced by the bit flip operation. Then Pro-
tocol IV reduces to PM-QKD protocol in the manuscript.
PM-QKD
1. State preparation: Alice randomly generates a
key bit κa, and picks a random phase φja from
the set {ja 2pi
D
}D−1ja=0, and the intensity µia from
{0, ν/2, µ/2}. She then prepares the coherent state∣∣√µiaei(φja+piκa)〉A. Similarly, Bob generates κb,
φjb , µib and then prepares
∣∣√µibei(φjb+piκb)〉B .
2. Measurement: Alice and Bob send their optical
pulses, A and B, to an untrusted party, Eve, who is
expected to perform an interference measurement
and record the detector (L or R) that clicks.
3. Announcement: Eve announces the detection re-
sult for each round. After that, Alice and Bob
announce their random phases and intensity set-
tings {ja, µa} and {jb, µb} and keep the signals with
µa = µb.
4. Sifting: When Eve announces a successful detec-
tion, (a click from exactly one of the detectors L
or R), Alice and Bob keep κa and κb. Bob flips
his key bit κb if Eve’s announcement was an R
click. Then, Alice and Bob group the signals by
js = (ja − jb) mod D. If js ∈ [D4 , 3D4 ), Bob flips
his key bit κb. After that, Alice and Bob merge the
data with js and js +
D
2 , with js = 0, 1, ...,
D
2 − 1.
5. Parameter estimation: For all the raw data that
they have retained, Alice and Bob record the detect
number M
(js)
ia,ib
of different intensity combinations
{µia , µib} and phase groups js. They then estimate
the information leakage Ephµ using Eq. (B27).
6. Key generation: For the signals with µia = µib =
µ/2, Alice and Bob group them by the phase index
js = min[(ja − jb) mod D, (jb − ja) mod D]. Af-
ter that, they keep the signals with js in a set J .
They reconcile the corresponding key string to κA
by an encrypted classical channel, with the con-
summation of ljsec-bit keys according to js. After
that, they perform privacy amplification according
to the estimated single-photon ratio q1 to generate
keys.
Appendix C: Finite data size analysis
In this section, we analyze the finite-size effect of PM-
QKD protocol introduced in the main text. Here we ig-
nore the effect caused by discrete phase randomization.
Recall that during the post-processing in PM-QKD, Al-
ice and Bob first reconcile their sifted raw key bits Ka
and Kb with for each phase group js = ja−jb separately.
They keep some of the phase groups js ∈ J for key gen-
eration. They then estimate the single photon fraction
qJ1 for all the remaining data in J and perform privacy
amplification.
As is mentioned in the maintext, in QKD finite-size
analysis, one should take the cost and failure probability
of channel authentication, error verification, privacy am-
plification, and parameter estimation into account. How-
ever, the cost of the first three steps are negligible com-
paring to the one in parameter estimation. When the fi-
nal key length is much larger than 37 bits, one can ignore
the corresponding failure probability with a constant se-
cret key cost [9]. For simplicity, we ignore these parts in
our analysis. The finite-size key length Nk is then
Nk =
∑
j∈J
M jsi[1−H(Eph)− fH(Ej)], (C1)
with the failure probability of eph. Here M
j
si is the sifted
raw key length of phase group j before error verification
and privacy amplification, f is the error correction effi-
ciency, Ej is the quantum bit error rate of group j, Eph is
the estimated upper bound of phase error rate bounded
by
Eph < 1− qJ1 = 1−
MµJ1
MµJ
, (C2)
with a failure probability of eph. Here M
µJ is the click
round number with µa = µb = µ/2 and phase group js ∈
J , and MµJ1 is the estimated single photon component in
it.
The core of parameter estimation of Eph is to esti-
mate the clicked rounds caused by the single photon
component MµJ1 , for all the clicked rounds with
µa = µb = µ/2 and all the left phase group J . Here, we
follow Ref. [35] for a tight decoy-state analysis in the
finite-data regime.
As is stated in Appendix B 4, since the single photon
state ρ1 is the same whatever φa and φb is, we can first
estimate the single photon clicks Mµ1 caused by all the
phase groups with different jd all together, and then es-
timate MµJ1 for the left groups J afterwards.
Without matching the random phase φa, φb by js, the
state on optical modes A,B sent out to Eve when µa =
µb = µ/2 is
ρAB =
∑
k
Pµ(k)ρtotk , (C3)
where
ρtolk =
∫ pi
0
dδ ρδk =
∑
ka,kb
B(ka; k,
1
2
) |ka, kb〉 〈ka, kb| ,
(C4)
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and B(k;n, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)(n−k) is the binomial distri-
bution. ρδk is given by Eq. (B35). Note that ρ
tot
1 = ρ1.
For different intensities {0, ν, µ}, the k-photon compo-
nent ρtotk are the same, following Poisson distribution
with different parameter. Therefore, the former finite-
size decoy state analysis on BB84 protocol can be directly
applied to PM-QKD.
For each intensity {0, ν, µ}, suppose Alice and
Bob send out Nvac, Nw, Ns rounds of pulses, with
Mvac,Mw,Ms rounds of effective clicks, respectively.
We have,
Nvac ≈ (rvac)2N,
Nw ≈ (rw)2N,
Ns ≈ (rs)2N.
(C5)
A unified notation is {Na,Ma}, with a ∈ {vac, w, s} in-
dicating the intensity setting of vacuum, weak and signal.
Denote the normalized rate of each intensity setting a in
the final clicked signals as
qa = Na/N, (C6)
note that, qa is a fixed number after Alice and Bob send
out all the signals.
For a specific intensity setting a ∈ {vac, w, s}, denote
the rounds of sending out k-photon pulses ρtotk and clicks
caused by it as {Nak ,Mak }. Define
Nk ≡
∑
a
Nak , (C7)
to be the overall rounds to send k-photon signals. Denote
the conditional probability that Alice and Bob choose the
intensity setting a when sending out k-photon signal as
p(a|k) = lim
Nk→∞
Nak
Nk
=
qaP a(k)
qvacP 0(k) + qwP ν(k) + qsPµ(k)
,
(C8)
here we slightly abuse the notation P a(k) to denote the
Poisson distribution with intensity setting a.
Therefore we have
Na =
∑
k
Nak ≈
∑
k
p(a|k)Nk
Ma =
∑
k
Mak ≈
∑
k
p(a|k)Mk,
(C9)
where p(vac|k) = 0 for all k 6= 0.
In the whole QKD process, the values {Na}a and
{Ma}a are known by Alice and Bob. The values {Nak }a,k
are available to Alice and Bob in principle and cannot be
controlled by Eve. The values {Mk}k are, however, con-
trolled by Eve and unknown to Alice and Bob.
The core observations to perform finites-size analysis
in this case are
1. When Alice and Bob send out k-photon signals, the
choosing of different intensity setting a is indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), given by
the probability distribution p(a|k).
2. Eve’s attack on k-photon signals cannot depend on
the intensity setting a.
Therefore, Eve’s attack can be described by a random
sampling from the set of Nk. She randomly chooses Mk
rounds from it and announces them as effective clicks.
Among them, {Mak }a, i.e., the clicks caused by different
intensity settings, are randomly distributed.
To clarify the random sampling model, we can then
rewrite Mak as
M¯ak =
Mk∑
i=1
(χ¯ak)i, (C10)
where
(χ¯ak)i =
{
1 with probability pak,
0 with probability 1− pak,
(C11)
(with i = 1, ...,Mk) are i.i.d. indicator random variables.
Group these random variables and define
M¯a =
∑
k
M¯ak =
∑
k
Mk∑
i=1
(χ¯ak)i, (C12)
as the variable indicating the overall clicks caused by in-
tensity setting a. The bar on Mak is used to indicate that
it is a variable.
The decoy state problem can be modeled as: for the
unknown {Mk}k and the known {pak}a,k, to evaluate the
value of the variable M¯s1 , given the observed constraints
that {M¯a = Ma}a.
We first observe that,
E(M¯ak ) = p(a|k)Mk, (C13)
and hence
E(M¯a) =
∑
k
E(M¯ak ) =
∑
k
p(a|k)Mk. (C14)
Note that, the expectation value are taken with respect to
the i.i.d. variables {(χ¯ai )j}a,i,j . Therefore, we can bound
the expected values E(M¯a) by applying an inversed form
of Chernoff bound on Eq. (C12) and with the observed
{Ma}a. From Eq. (C14), we have
EU (M¯a) ≥
∑
k
p(a|k)Mk ≥ EL(M¯a), (C15)
where we use superscript U and L to denote upper and
lower bound respectively.
To estimate Ms1 , we first estimate M1 from Eq. (C15),
and then estimate Ms1 by a direct use of Chernoff bound
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on Eq. (C10). We briefly summarize the results of Cher-
noff bound in Appendix C 1.
The decoy method discussed above is based on the for-
mula Eq. (C14) and the correlation between variables
{M¯a,Mk}. To unify it with the former decoy state for-
mulas with {Qa, Yk}, we further define the gain and yield
variable as
Q¯a :=
M¯a
Na
,
Y ∗k :=
Mk
N∞k
,
(C16)
where
N∞k =
∑
a
P a(k)Na =
∑
a
P a(k)(ra)2N, (C17)
is the expectation value of Nk.
From Eq. (C14) and the definition of Q¯a, Y¯ ∗k in
Eq. (C16), we can recover the decoy state formula ex-
pressed by Q¯a and Y¯ ∗k ,
E[Q¯a] =
E[M¯a]
Na
=
∑
k p(a|k)Mk
Na
=
∑
k
qaP a(k)
qvacP 0(k) + qwP ν(k) + qsPµ(k)
Mk
qaN
,
=
∑
k
P a(k)
Mk
N [qvacP 0(k) + qwP ν(k) + qsPµ(k)]
,
=
∑
k
P a(k)
Mk
N∞k
,
=
∑
k
P a(k)Y ∗k .
(C18)
Now, with the observed value Ma, we can calculate
Qa, and apply the decoy state formulas,
EU [Q¯a] ≥
∑
k
Pµ(k)Y ∗k ≥ EL[Q¯a], (C19)
With (C19), we can estimate Y ∗1 by[35]
Y ∗1 ≥ (Y ∗1 )L =
µ
µν − ν2
(
EL[Qw]eν − EU [Qs]eµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
EU [Qvac]
)
. (C20)
Note that the whole process can be divided into two
steps. Step I is to estimate (Y ∗1 )
L and (M1)
L for all
of the phase groups. Step II is to estimate (Ms,J1 )
L for
phase group set J from (M1)
L in all phase group. To
summarize, the whole phase error estimation process is
1. To record {Ns, Nw, Nvac} and record the number
of clicked rounds {Ms,Mw,Mvac}.
2. (Step I) Based on an inversed usage of Chernoff
bound, to calculate {EU (M¯a),EL(M¯a)}a, given
Ma and estimate the failure probability 1. Cal-
culate the {EU (Q¯a),EL(Q¯a)}a by Eq. (C16).
3. Calculate the lower bound (Y ∗1 )
L based on
{EU (Q¯a),EL(Q¯a)}a by Eq. (C20). Calculate
(M1)
L by Eq. (C16).
4. (Step II) Based on a direct usage of Chernoff
bound, to calculate (Ms,J1 )
L for phase group set
J and estimate the failure probability 2. To cal-
culate Eph based on Eq. (C2). The overall failure
probability is eph = 1 + 2.
1. Chernoff bound
Here we present the methods to evaluate E(M¯a) from
Ma and evaluate Ms1 from M1 using Chernoff bounds.
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To evaluate E(M¯a) from Ma, we inversely use the
Chernoff bounds based on Bernoulli variables. We briefly
summarize the results in Ref. [35]. For the observed value
χ, we set the lower and upper bound of estimated E(χ)
as {EL(χ),EU (χ)}. Denote
EL(χ) =
χ
1 + δL
,
EU (χ) =
χ
1− δU .
(C21)
The failure probability of the estimation E(χ) ∈
[EL(χ),EU (χ)], given by the Chernoff bound, is
 = e−χg2(δ
L) + e−χg2(δ
U ), (C22)
where g2(x) = ln(1 + x)− x/(1 + x).
To evaluate Ms1 from M1, we directly apply the Cher-
noff bounds. Suppose the direct sampling expectation
value of Ms1 is given by E(Ms1 ) = ps1M1. For the ex-
pected value E(χ), we set the lower and upper bound of
the estimated χ as {χL, χU}. Denote
χL = (1− δ¯L)E(χ),
χU = (1 + δ¯U )E(χ).
(C23)
The failure probability of the estimation χ ∈ [χL, χU ],
given by the Chernoff bound, is
 = e−(δ¯
L)2E(χ)/(2+δ¯L) + e−(δ¯
U )2E(χ)/(2+δ¯U ). (C24)
In practice, we can preset the lower bound and upper
bound {EL(χ),EU (χ)} or {χL, χU} by assuming a Gaus-
sian distribution on χ first,
EL(χ) = χ− nα√χ, EU (χ) = χ+ nα√χ,
χL = χ− nα
√
E(χ), χU = χ+ nα
√
E(χ),
(C25)
where nα is a preset parameter to determine the esti-
mation precision. After that, we calculate the failure
probabilities by Eq. (C22) and Eq. (C24).
Appendix D: Simulation formula and results
Here we list the formulas used to simulate the key rate
performance of PM-QKD and MDI-QKD in Fig. 2 the
main text. The channel is modeled to be a pure loss one
and symmetric for Alice and Bob with transmittance η
(with the detector efficiency ηd taken into account).
1. Gain, yield and error rate of PM-QKD
In PM-QKD, suppose Alice and Bob emit the k-photon
light ρδk in Eq. (B35), the yield (i.e., effective detection
probability) Yk is given by, Eq. (B13) in Ref. [19],
Yk ≈ 1− (1− 2pd)(1− η)k, (D1)
suppose Alice and Bob emit the coherent states ρ in
Eq. (B8) with µa = µb = µ/2, the gain (i.e., effective
detection probability) Qµ is ( Eq. (B14) in Ref. [19])
Qµ ≈ 1− (1− 2pd)e−ηµ. (D2)
As is stated in the main text, the quantum bit error
rate Ejs is mainly composed of three components. The
first one is the intrinsic error e∆(js) caused by phase
mismatch when js 6= 0,
e∆(js) =
{
sin2(pijsD ), js ≤ D2 ,
sin2(pi2 − pijsD ), js > D2 ,
(D3)
which is related to the index deviation js. The second
one is the extra misalignment error e0, caused by phase
fluctuation. Here we regard e0 and e∆(js) as caused by
independent factors, and the overall misalignment error
is ed(js) = e0 + e∆(js). Also, the dark count effect will
contribute to the bit error. The overall bit error rate
E
(js)
µ is then given by
E(js)µ = [pd + ηµ(e∆(js) + e0)]
e−ηµ
Qµ
, (D4)
where pd is the dark count rate.
2. Simulation formulas for MDI-QKD protocols
The key rate of MDI-QKD is [13]
RMDI =
1
2
{Q11[1−H(e11)]− fQrectH(Erect)}, (D5)
where Q11 = µaµbe
−µa−µbY11 and 1/2 is the basis sifting
factor. We take this formula from Eq. (B27) in Ref. [33].
In simulation, the gain and error rates are
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Y11 = (1− pd)2[ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d],
e11 = e0Y11 − (e0 − ed)(1− p2d)
ηaηb
2
,
Qrect = Q
(C)
rect +Q
(E)
rect,
Q
(C)
rect = 2(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[1− (1− pd)e−ηaµa/2][1− (1− pd)e−ηbµb/2],
Q
(E)
rect = 2pd(1− pd)2e−µ
′/2[I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−µ′/2],
ErectQrect = edQ
(C)
rect + (1− ed)Q(E)rect,
(D6)
where µ′ denotes the average number of photons reaching
Eve’s beam splitter, µa = µb = µ/2, ηa = ηb = η, and
µ′ = ηaµa + ηbµb,
x =
1
2
√
ηaµaηbµb.
(D7)
We take these formulas from Eqs. (A9), (A11), (B7), and
(B28)-(B31) in Ref. [33].
The linear key-rate bound of repeaterless point-to-
point QKD protocol used in the maintext is [17],
RPLOB = − log2(1− η). (D8)
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